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A. Cohen's Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality is a
collection of previously published essays and four
newly written essays brought together under a common context. This common context is the question of
why Marxism has failed to answer the challenge of
Noz.ickian libertarianism as set forth in Robert Nozick's
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). According to
Cohen, the failure of Marxism to challenge Nozickian
libertarianism results from the fact that Marxism and
libertarianism share a fundamental value or premise.
This premise is the thesis of self-ownership. Cohen argues that we must reject the thesis of self-ownership
because it is incompatible with equality and freedom.
He thus revisions the relationship between liberty and
equality as well as Marxian justice. He rejects both the
Nozickian contention that the thesis of self-ownership
affirms and guarantees freedom (and is, thus, the only
guarantee of freedom) and the Marxian contention
that equal distribution of the material means of production based on the thesis of self-ownership results in
equality.
In the first three chapters, Cohen extensively attacks Nozick's libertarianism. Nozick begins by conjoining the thesis of self-ownership-that is, that everyone has a right to their own bodies and
powers-with the premise that the world is unowned
in its original state. From this beginning, Nozick concludes that any sort of egalitarian society would violate
the resulting principle of libertarianism: that one is
freed to do as one wills with the property one appropriates through exercise of one's bodies and powers. If
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people are allowed to do what they want, then inequality will necessarily result. Cohen holds that the egalitarian can attack this approach
in two ways: first, the egalitarian can argue that self-ownership does
not necessarily lead to inequality of worldly resources; and second,
they might combine an egalitarian approach to worldly resources with
a non-denial of self-ownership. Concerning blocking the move from
the thesis of self-ownership to the result of inequality of resources,
Cohen notes that Nozick begins his justification of original appropriation, on which all other property is justified, through use of the
Lockean proviso that "enough and as good be left for others.,, Cohen
rightly argues that Nozick,s argument does not work because he weakens Locke6s original intent by claiming that the Lockean proviso
guarantees only that no one6s situation be made worse under an
original appropriation of some object. Instead, a defensibly strong
Lockean proviso rules out the formation of full liberal private property and puts a stop to Nozick's argument. Further, by calling his
theory "libertarian," Nozick implies that freedom is his highest value.
However, the liberty which is guaranteed under Nozick,s libertarianism is merely formal for the majority of people. A person under
Nozickian justice has a formal right to do ass/he wishes, but this right
cannot be exercised without access to resources. When resources are
unequally distributed, a person is forced to work for others, for example.
With this conclusion, Cohen,s real task begins: showing that
Marxism rests on the thesis of self-ownership and trying to repair the
damage this causes. According to Cohen, conjoining the thesis of selfownership with an equality of condition results only in a formal freedom-just as Nozick,s libertarianism did. Libertarians themselves
cannot complain about such a result. However, an egalitarian who
values freedom must reject the thesis of self-ownership. Unfonunately, Marx's argument against capitalism and private property relies
on the thesis of self-ownership. The Marxist argument against capitalism rests on the claim that the "workers are deprived access to physical
productive resources and must therefore sell their labor power to capitalists" (119). Labor power falls under the penumbra of self-ownership: we have the right to do what we wish with our powers, etc. The
proletariat must sell this labor power if the proletariat is to live. The
proletariat is forced to work for others, and, thus, the self-ownership
of the proletariat is violated. "The claim that capitalists steal time
,.,J rom working people implies that the worker is the proper owner of
l "'i?own power" (146). Consider the joyful worker and the infirm
rc~it.alist. The worker enjoys the work performed and the wages the
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worker earns from the work. The capitalist hates life, but has amassed
some capital. The capitalist extracts just enough wages from the
worker's product in order to maintain the capitalist's life. That is, the
worker produces so much product; and the capitalist takes a certain
percentage of that product to give to the worker as wages and keeps
just the smallest amount to maintain the capitalist's life. Marxists are
committed to calling the relationship between the joyful worker and
the infirm capitalist unjustly exploitative, even though the worker is
happy and the capitalist is miserable. But calling this relationship unjustly exploitative simply affirms the principle of self-ownership.
Rather than affirming the thesis of self-ownership, and maintaining that capitalism and inequality of resources is unjust because both
violate the thesis of self-ownership, Cohen holds that a
maldistribution of the means of production is not only intrinsically
unjust but is also unjust because of what it produces, viz inequality.
This means rejecting the thesis of self-ownership. Forcing people to
do something is not always wrong. Cohen, however, believes that we
cannot refute the thesis of self-ownership but only make it less appealing. He argues that the thesis of self-ownership gets its appeal from
being confused with three other values. These values include: 1) not
being anyone's slave, 2) not restricting human autonomy, and 3) not
treating people as mere means. Libertarians argue that autonomy is
only guaranteed for people if they possess the rights constituting selfownership. But, Cohen contends, the "self-seeking authorized by selfownership" combined with people of varying talents results in a world
of propertyless proletarians who have constricted freedom, or, i.e.,
merely formal freedom (237). Promoting autonomy does not necessitate promoting self-ownership.
Cohen's book is very technical in parts, particularly when he discusses Nozick,s libertarianism in the first three chapters. Overall, the
arguments against Nozick are satisfactory. But it seems that one might
question whether Marxism places such a high value on self-ownership
or, if it does, what motivates this value. Throughout the work, a discussion of Marx's theory of alienation is noticeably lacking. This is
odd given Cohen's previous work and defense of Marx's theory of history in Karl Marx's Theory of History. In any case, Marx held that
what was wrong with capitalism, and with the ownership of the
means of production being located in a few hands, was the alienation
of the laborer from the laborer's product. The only way a person can
recognize one's self as human is through objectifying one,s self in social interaction. When the capitalist takes part or all of the product of
labor, then labor does not accomplish its end: labor appears alien to
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the worker.
More should be said in Cohen's discussion of the joyful worker
and the infirm capitalist. The capitalist is still removing something
from the laborer: the humanity of the laborer, the role of the laborer
in an objective sphere. Affirming that the laborer is joyful appears to
beg the question against Marx, rather than presenting a dilemma with
which a Marxian analysis cannot cope. The concentration of the
means of production in a few hands is intrinsically wrong because it
results in alienated labor. All of Cohen's argument against capitalism
and inequality misses Marx's basic contention that capitalism alienates the laborer. The principle of self-ownership which is implicit in
Nozick, then, is quite different from the principle of self-ownership
which can be found in Marx. The first is simply an affirmation of the
rights which constitute self-ownership as the most fundamental value
in society, while the second rests on attempting to overcome the alienation inherent in economic systems.
The book, however, is worth reading because Cohen raises various points which need to be looked at in further discussions of the
value and viability of an egalitarian economic system. While he does
not discuss the theme of alienation as described by Marx, ("alienation,, is only mentioned on three pages), Cohen does provide trenchant analysis and criticism of Marxist egalitarian goals. Further, his
analysis is indeed a revisioning of justice as conceived in Marxism. As
such, it provides a useful starting point from a non-Marxist or perhaps a revised-Marxist view for further defenses of egalitarianism.
Herein lies the main value of the work. This book would be good for
anyone concerned with economic justice, particularly egalitarian approaches to economic distribution, as well as those more generally interested in either Nozick or Marx. I think the fundamental concern
for Cohen is attempting to reconcile the old rivalry between freedom
and equality. The book therefore provides important reading for those
interested in the socio-theoretical concerns of the functioning of society.
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